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The Relationship Between National and
Community Antitrust Law: An Overview
After the Perfume Cases
Jeam-Francois Verstrynge *
The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and the Treaty of
Rome have been recognized as transferring the jurisdictional authority to
apply antitrust laws to the European Communities. After surveying the im-
pact of these treaties on various sectors, the author argues that it is necessary
to subordinate the jurisdictional authority of the Member States in thisfield
to fulfill the objectives of the Common Market.
To commemorate the twenty-five year history of the European Ec-
onomic Community, it is worthwhile to devote some reflections to the
so often misunderstood relationship between national and Community
antitrust law. It became even more appropriate to address this question
when the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg further clarified its
position in its judgment on July 10, 1980 in the Perfume cases.' This
article will provide a comprehensive overview of the present state of the
relationship between national and Community antitrust law.
Currently, jurisdiction in the Common Market is being transferred
from the Member States to the European Communities. This transfer
is in part the result of two Treaties, the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity Treaty (ECSC)2 and the European Economic Community
* Member of the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities. Fellow at
the Center for International Affairs-Harvard University. The opinions expressed in this article
reflect only those of the author.
I Procureur de la R6publique v. Bruno Giry and Guerlain S.A. and others, [1980] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2327, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 99.
2 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140 (entered into force July 23, 1952) [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
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Treaty (EEC).3 This article will examine these Treaties4 and secondary
legislation and attempt to demonstrate that when applicable, Commu-
nity antitrust law must take precedence over national antitrust law.
Granting priority to Community antitrust law, however, will not com-
pletely discharge the jurisdiction of the Member States. National anti-
trust law can sometimes be used to supplement and compliment
Community antitrust law. This article will conclude with an examina-
tion of the manner in which national antitrust law may perform this
function.
JURISDICTION
To properly analyze the relationship between national and Com-
munity antitrust law, it is necessary to first clarify the scope of jurisdic-
tion accorded to Community antitrust law. This addresses the
question: "When does Community antitrust law intervene?"
L General Transfer of Jurisdiction
The ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty transfer jurisdiction from
the Member States to the European Communities. In several cases, the
Court of Justice confirmed that these two Treaties included a certain
transfer of jurisdiction from the Member States to the European
Communities.
The Court first indicated its position with respect to the ECSC
Treaty in 1961:
[U]nder Article 1 of the Treaty the Community is founded upon a com-
mon market, common objectives and common institutions. In the Com-
munity field, namely in respect to everything that pertains to the pursuit
of the common objectives within the common market, the institutions of
the Community have been endowed with exclusive authority.
5
Similarly, the Court of Justice interpreted the EEC Treaty to grant
priority to the Community law. In the van Gend & Loos case of 1963,
the Court noted that Member States had limited their own sovereignty.
More particularly, the Court stated:
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
4 These questions must be asked in the context of each of the European Community Treaties
since the answers may be different in each Treaty. Hereafter this problem will not, however, be
analyzed with regard to Article 60 of the Euratom Treaty, Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958)
[hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty].
5 De Gezamelijke Steenkoolmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community, [1961] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 22 (emphasis added).
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The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Mar-
ket, the functioning of which is to direct concern to interested parties in
the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which
merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. This
view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to
governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the
establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of
which affects Member States and also their citizens.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limitedflelds, and the sub-
jects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law there-
fore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to
confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.6
This observation indicated a transfer of Member State sovereign
rights. Further, the Court confirmed this position in Costa v. ENEL the
following year when it stated:
[B]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has cre-
ated its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty,
became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and
which their courts are bound to apply.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institu-
tions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of represen-
tation on the international plane, and, more particularly real powers
stemmingfrom a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the
States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign
rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law
which binds both their nationals and themselves.7
The most emphatic discussion of this transfer of sovereign rights
was set forth in Commission v. Italy, Case 48/71. There, the Court
noted:
The grant made by Member States to the Community of rights and pow-
ers in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty involves a dfnitive
limitation on their sovereign rights and no provisions whatsoever of na-
tional law may be invoked to override this limitation.8
6 N.V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse
administratie der belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration), [1963] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1, 12, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105, 129 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as van Gend &
Loos].
7 Flamino Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 585, 593, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 455 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Costa v.
ENEL].
8 Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, Case 48/71, [1972] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 527, 532, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 699, 708. (emphasis added).
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2. Transfer of Jurisdiction in the ECSC Antitrust Context
The ECSC Treaty is generally recognized as completely transfer-
ring the jurisdiction to apply antitrust law to the European Communi-
ties. This authority is derived directly from the language of Articles
65(1), 66(1) and 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty since this language leaves no
room for the application of national antitrust law.9
The subsequent EEC Treaty has not modified the transfer of juris-
diction under the ECSC Treaty. Article 232(1) of the EEC Treaty pro-
vides that no provisions of that Treaty will affect the provisions of the
ECSC Treaty.' 0
The European Commission (having replaced the High Authority)
also recognized the complete transfer of jurisdiction from the Member
States to the Communities. In its second report on competition policy,
the European Commission concluded that restrictive agreements,
mergers and other potential antitrust violations in the coal and steel
fields must be analyzed according to Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC
9 Article 65(l) provides:
All agreements between undertakings, decisions, by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort normal competition
within the Common Market shall 
be prohibited ... .
ECSC Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 65(1) (emphasis added).
Article 66(1) provides:
Any transaction shall require the prior authorization of the High Authority, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, if it has in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing
about within the territories referred to in the first paragraph of Article 79, as a result of action
by any person or undertaking or group of persons or undertakings a concentration between
undertakings at least one of which is covered by Article 80, whether the transaction concerns
a single product or a number of different products...
Id at art. 66(1) (emphasis added).
Article.66(7) provides:
If the High Authority finds that public or private undertakings which, in law or in fact, hold
or acquirk in the marketfor one of theproducts within itsjurisdiction a dominantposition shield-
ing them against effective competition in a substantial part of the Common Market are using
that position for purposes contrary to the objectives of this Treaty, it shall make to them such
recommendations as may be appropriateto prevent the position from being so used.
Id at art. 66(7) (emphasis added).
In addition, Article 80 (to which Article 66 refers), provides that:
For the purposes of this Treaty, "undertaking" means any undertaking engaged in produc-
tion in the coal or the steel industry within the territories referred to in the first paragraph of
Article 79, and, also,for thepurposes of A4rticles 65 and 66 and of information required for
their application and proceedings in connection with them, any undertaking or agency regu-
lary engaged in distribution other than sale to domestic consumers or small craft industries.
Id at art. 80 (emphasis added).
10 Article 232(1) states:
The provisions of this Treaty shall not affect the provisions of the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, in particular as regards the rights and obligations of
Member States, the powers of the institutions of that Community and the rules laid down by
that Treaty of the Functioning of the Common Market in coal and steel.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 232(1).
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Treaty. Such analysis is solely within the Communities' jurisdiction."
Therefore, in the context of the ECSC Treaty, the European Communi-
ties are exclusively competent to apply antitrust rules.
3. Transfer of Jurisdiction in the EEC Antitrust Context
With respect to EEC jurisdiction over antitrust matters, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between those products and/or sectors subject to
special rules in the EEC Treaty and those which are regulated only by
the general rules of the EEC Treaty. The products and/or sectors gov-
erned by special rules are agricultural products which are listed in An-
nex II of the EEC Treaty,12 some transport services which come within
the application of Articles 74 through 84 of the EEC Treaty, 3 and mili-




Articles 38 et seq. of the EEC Treaty 5 require that the general
transfer of jurisdiction for agricultural products be completed at the
end of the transition period in 1970. Article 40 enumerates methods
which Member States might adopt to formulate a common agricultural
policy, one of which is establishing common rules on competition.
16
The Court had already expressed a commitment to establish a common
I1 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 32 n.27
(1973). See also EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POL-
icy 64 n. 113 (1977).
12 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at Annex II.
13 Id at arts. 74-84.
14 Id at art. 223.
15 Id at arts. 38 et seq.
16 More particularly, Article 40 provides:
1. Member States shall develop the common agricultural policy by degrees during the transi-
tional period and shall bring it into force by the end of that period at the latest.
2. In order to attain the objectives set out in Art. 39 a common organization of agricultural
markets shall be established.
This organization shall take one of the following forms, depending on the product concerned:
(a) common rules on competition;
(b) compulsory coordination of the various national market organizations;
(c) a European market organization.
3. The common organization established in accordance with paragraph 2 may include all
measures required to attain the objectives set out in Art. 39, in particular regulation of prices,
aids for the production and marketing of the various products, storage and carry-over ar-
rangements and common machinery for stabilizing imports or exports.
The common organization shall be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Art. 39 and
shall exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community.
Any common price policy shall be based on common criteria and uniform methods of
calculation.
Id at art. 40 (emphasis added).
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agricultural policy by 1974. In the Charmasson case,' 7 the Court held
that a national organization df the market could not be maintained af-
ter the end of the transitional period without contravening the rules of
the EEC Treaty. Subsequently, the Court took a stronger position in
Officier van Justitie v. Beert van den Hazel." In this case, the Court
ruled that Member States must not undermine any measure taken pur-
suant to Article 40. One year later, the Court of Justice in Procureur du
Roi v. Dechmann,19 stated that: "In order to bring about this single
market, the regulation established a system comprising a set of material
rules and of powers, including aframework of organization calculated to
meet allforeseeable situations.
20
In the Charmasson case, the Court indicated that the European
Communities' jurisdiction was not dependent upon immediate occu-
pancy of the field by the European Communities. Rather, the Court
maintained that the jurisdictional transfer should occur at the end of
the transitional period. The most recent confirmation of the Court's
position was expressed in Commission v. United Kingdom, Case 231/
78.21 In this case, the Court stated:
[I]t follows, as the Court held in its judgment of December 10, 1974 in
case 48/74 Charmasson (1974) ECR 1383, that after the expiration of the
transitional period the operation of a national market organization can no
longer prevent full effect being given to the provisions of the Treaty relat-
ing to the elimination of quantitative restrictions and all markets con-
cerned in this respect thence-forward becoming the responsibility of the
Community institutions. The expiration of the transitionalperiod laid down
by the Treaty meant that, from that time, those matters and areas explicitly
attributed to the Community came under Community jurisdiction, so that if
it were still necessary to have recourse to special measures, these could no
longer be determined unilaterally by the Member States concerned, but
had to be adopted within the framework of the Community system
designed to ensure that the general interest of the Community would be
protected.22
The argument implicit in the judgments of the Court of Justice is
that the European Communities should ultimately have exclusive juris-
diction over agricultural products, at least for those matters already ex-
pressly attributed to it. This jurisdiction includes the power to apply
17 Mr. Charmasson v. Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance (Paris), [1974] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1383, 1394-95, [1975] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 208, 225.
18 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 901, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 12.
19 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1573, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1.
20 Id at 1583, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 17 (emphasis added).
21 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, Case 231/78, [1979] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1447, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 427.
22 Id at 1461, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 438 (emphasis added).
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antitrust rules in this sector, because Article 40(2) refers explicitly to
"common rules on competition." Furthermore, Article 42 of the EEC
Treaty indirectly confirms this proposition by giving the Council of
Ministers of the EEC the power to take measures necessary to govern a
possible conflict between the rules of the common agricultural policy
based on Article 40 and the general antitrust rules of the EEC Treaty.
The existence of Article 42 of the EEC Treaty itself thus confirms the
complete transfer of jurisdiction in antitrust matters to the European
Communities.
Pursuant to this power, the Council adopted a special regulation.
Article 1 of this regulation provides:
[F]rom the entry into force of this Regulation, article 85 to 90 of the
Treaty and provisions made in implementation thereof shal, subject to
Article 2 below, apply to all agreements, decisions and practices referred
to in Articles 85(1) and 86 of the Treaty which relate to production of or
trade in the products listed in Annex II to the Treaty.23
Therefore, as far as agricultural products are concerned, the European
Communities have exclusive jurisdiction to apply antitrust rules.
B. Transport Sector
The provisions laid down in the EEC Treaty, particularly Articles
74 and 75, authorize a similar general transfer of jurisdiction in the
transportation sector as in the agricultural sector at the end of a transi-
tion period. Article 74 provides that the Member States should pursue
the objectives of the Treaty pursuant to a common transport policy. 4
Specifically, Article 75 authorizes the Council, after consultation with
certain Community institutions, to enact common rules pertaining to
the transport of goods through and within Member States.
23 EEC Council: Regulation No. 26 applying certain rules of competition to production of
and trade in agricultural products, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 30) 993 (1962), O.J. COMM. EUR. 129
(Spec. Ed. 1959-62).
24 Article 74 provides: "The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters governed by this Title, be
pursued by Member States within the framework to a common transport policy." EEC Treaty,
supra note 3, at art. 74 (emphasis added).
25 Article 75 provides that:
1. For the purpose of implementing Article 74, and taking into account the distinctive fea-
tures of transport, the Council shall, acting unanimously until the end of the second stage
and by a qualified majority thereafter lay down, on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Assembly:
(a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a
Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member States;
(b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services
within a Member State;
(c) any other appropriate provisions.
2. The provisions referred to in (a) and (b) of paragraph I shall be laid down during the
transitional period.
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The role of Community antitrust law in the transport sector has
not yet been clearly defined by the Court. Unlike Title II concerning
agricultural products, Title IV of the EEC Treaty which pertains to
transport does not embody any rule comparable to Article 42. Thus, it
must be inferred from this situation that the general antitrust rules of
the EEC Treaty apply to the transport sector without any other restric-
tions than those contained in the implementing regulations.26
Furthermore, case law concerning the transport sector is limited.
The "common rules" referred to in Article 75(l)(a) or the "regulatory
system" referred to in Article 75(3) should arguably include antitrust
rules. A common transport policy requires the same uniform applica-
tion of Community regulations as the establishment of a common agri-
cultural policy. Moreover, Article 75 provides a sufficient legal basis
for the adoption of such common antitrust rules.
Although there is no explicit transfer of the exclusive jurisdiction
over antitrust matters in the transport sector with a provision similar to
Article 40(2) for agricultural products, a similar argument as the one
made by the Court of Justice in the Charmasson case for agricultural
products could probably be based on Article 75. If this is the case, one
would have to conclude that jurisdiction over antitrust matters has also
been completely transferred to the European Communities in the trans-
port sector.
C. Military Products
A Member State still yields significant jurisdictional authority in
the sector of military products under Article 223(l)(b). This Article
provides that:
[A]ny Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for
the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected
with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such
3. By way of derogation from the procedure provided for in paragraph 1, where the applica-
tion of provisions concerning the principles of the regulatory system for transport would
be liable to have a serious effect on the standard of living and on employment in certain
areas and on the operation of transport facilities, they shall be laid down by the Council
unanimously. In so doing, the Council shall take into account the need for adaptation to
the economic development which will result from establishing the Common Market.
Id at art. 75 (emphasis added).
26 Regulation (EEC) No. 1017/68 of the Council of July 19, 1968, applying rules of competi-
tion to transport by rail, road and inland waterway, J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L. 175) 1 (1968), O.J.
EUR. COMM. 302 (Spec. Ed. 1968 (1)). The implementing rules of Regulation 1017/68 apply only
to the sectors of transport referred to in Article 84(1) of the EEC Treaty, note 3 supra. See also
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 23-24 n.12-15
(1980); EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 22-27
n.7-14.
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measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the
common market regarding products which are not intended for specifi-
cally military purposes.'
This provision may be read as limiting the jurisdiction of the European
Community to the extent necessary to protect the essential security in-
terests of each Member State. This could, in certain situations, limit
the application of antitrust rules established in the EEC Treaty.
D. Other Products and/or Sectors
Products and/or sectors for which no special rules have been set
forth in the EEC Treaty fall under the full application of the rules on
competition contained in Articles 85 to 90. For these, Article 87 pro-
vides that:
1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council
shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives
to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86...
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
designed in particular:
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provi-
sions contained in these sections or adopted pursuant to this
4rticle.
28
Article 87(2)(e) indicates that in the field of EEC antitrust law
there exists a situation of parallel jurisdiction between the national
Member States and the European Communities. Indeed, if the juris-
diction had been completely transferred to the European Communities
in this field, Article 87(2)(e) would not have been necessary. Neverthe-
less, this provision appears to transfer ultimate decision making power
to the European Communities by authorizing the Council of Ministers
to adopt regulations and to determine the relationship between Com-
munity and national laws.
The Court of Justice in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,"9 under-
scored this position when it ruled that unless Article 87(2)(e) of the
Treaty provided otherwise, national authorities could take action
against an agreement in accordance with their national law, even while
the Commission examined such action to determine its compatibility
with Community law. The Court, however, noted that any action
taken by a Member State was limited by Community law. Specifically,
the application of national law could not prejudice the application of
27 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 223(I)(b).
28 Id at art. 87 (emphasis added).
29 [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100.
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Community law.3
Recently, in the Perfume cases, the Court confirmed the situation
of parallel jurisdiction under the EEC Treaty:
As the Court held in its judgment of 13 February 1969 in Case 14/68 Walt
Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt (1969) ECR 1, Community law
and national law on competition consider restrictive practices from differ-
ent points of view. Whereas Articles 85 and 86 regard them in the light of
the obstacles which may result from trade between Member States, na-
tional law proceeds on the basis of the considerations peculiar to it and
considers restrictive practices only in that context. It follows that national
authorities may also take action in regard to situations which are capable
of forming the subject matter of a decision by the Commission.31
This situation also results indirectly from the repeated indications
that the phrase "trade between Member States may be affected" deline-
ates the jurisdiction of the European Communities.32 This phrase thus
provides indirect support for the concept of parallel jurisdiction. For
instance, in Consten & Grundig v. Commission33 the Court succinctly
noted that:
[T]he concept of an agreement "which may affect trade between Member
States" is intended to define, in the Law governing cartels, the boundary
between the areas respectively covered by Community Law and national
law. It is only to the extent to which the agreement may affect trade be-
tween Member States that the deterioration in competition caused by the
agreement falls under the prohibition of Community law contained in
Article 85; otherwise it escapes the prohibition.
34
30 Id at 15, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119.
31 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2374, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 136.
32 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 85(l), 86.
33 Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 299, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418.
34 Id. at 341, [1966] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 472 (emphasis added). Referring to the same phrase,
the court in Commercial Solvents v. Commission held that:
This expression is intended to dfne the sphere of application of Community rules in relation to
national laws. It cannot therefore be interpreted as limiting the field of application of the
grohibition which it contains to industrial and commercial activities supplying the Member
tates.
Instituto Chemioterpico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission of
the European Communities, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 252, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309,
342 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in Hugin v. Commission, the Court found that:
[t]he interpretation and application of the condition relating to effects on trade between Mem-
ber States contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty must be based on the purpose of that
condition, which is to dfme, in the context of the law governing competition, the boundary be-
tween the areas respectively covered by Community law and the law of the Member States.
Thus Community law covers any agreement or any practice which is capable of constituting a
threat to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which might harm the attain-
ment of the objectives of a single market between Member States, in particular by partition-
ing the national markets or by affecting the structure of competition within the Common
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Nonetheless, in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,35 the Court of Justice
concluded that cartels are considered differently under Community law
than under national law. Whereas Article 85 considers cartels in the
light of the obstacles which may result for trade between Member
States, each body of national legislation proceeds on the basis of con-
cerns peculiar to it and considers cartels only in that context. The
Court also found that it is true that as the economic phenomena and
legal situations under consideration may, in individual cases, be inter-
dependent, the distinction between Community and national aspects
could not serve in all cases as the decisive criterion for the delimitation
of jurisdiction.36
Thus, under the EEC Treaty there is parallel jurisdiction between
Member States and the European Communities regarding the applica-
tion of antitrust rules to other products and/or sectors. This jurisdic-
tion is only parallel, however, as long as the Council of Ministers does
not provide otherwise on the basis of Article 87(2)(e) of the EEC
Treaty.
E. Repartition of Jurisdiction to Apply EEC Antitrust Rules
The issue of the delimitation of the jurisdiction of the European
Communities must not be confused with the problem of determining
which institutions or authorities should apply the antitrust rules of the
EEC Treaty. Both the Commission and the authorities of the Member
States have the power to apply Articles 85(1) and 86.
The power of the Commission stems from Article 89 of the EEC
Treaty37 and Article 9(2) of Regulation 17/62.38 The Court of Justice
has also repeatedly held that the EEC Treaty empowers the Member
States' courts to apply Articles 85(1) and 86. This power results from
the direct applicability of these provisions. For example, in BRT v.
SABAM, the Court found that the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) and 86
inherently affect relations among individuals, and also create direct
Market. On the other hand, conduct the effects of which are confined to the territory of a
single Member State is governed by the national legal order.
Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd. v. Commission of the European Commu-
nities, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1869, 1899, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345, 372-73 (emphasis
added).
35 [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100.
36 Id at 13, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 118.
37 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 89.
38 EEC Council: Regulation No. 17: First Regulation Implementing articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 13) 204 (1962), O.J. EUR. COMM. 87 (Spec. Ed. 1959-62) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Regulation 17].
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rights for individuals which the national courts must protect.3 9 Simi-
larly in Sacchi4 the Court stated that in the framework of Article 90,
the provisions of Article 86 directly confer rights upon interested par-
ties which the national courts must certainly guard. In addition, Article
88 of the EEC Treaty and Article 9(3) of Regulation 17/62 mandate
that certain authorities within the Member States have the power to
apply Articles 85(1) and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
4'
Only the national courts of the Member States, however, have the
authority to apply the directly applicable provision of Article 85(2).
Application of this provision can, moreover, be subject to the proce-
dure based on Article 177 of the EEC Treaty.42 As far as Article 85(3)
is concerned, the Commission, pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation
17/62, is the only body which has the power to grant exemptions.43
IMPACT OF COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW AND CONSEQUENCES FOR
NATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
Having discussed the preliminary question of when Community
antitrust law intervenes, this article will now examine the issue of how
Community antitrust law intervenes with respect to national law of the
Member States. In addressing this question, it is necessary to first ex-
amine Community law in general and then more specifically consider
the application of the Community antitrust rules. This article will then
focus on the consequences regarding national antitrust law. This arti-
cle will finally examine the possibility of non-conflicting or complimen-
tary applications of national antitrust rules.
39 Belgische Radio en Televisie and Societe beige des auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs v. SV
SABAM and NV Fonior, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51, 62, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238, 271.
40 Guiseppe Sacchi, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409,430, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177,204.
41 Article 88 provides:
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 87, the authorities
in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted prac-
tices and on abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market in accordance with the law
of their country and with the provisions of Article 85, in particular paragraph 3, and of Arti-
cle 86.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 88 (emphasis added).
Article 9(3) of Regulation 17/62 states:
As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under Articles 2, 3 or 6, the
authorities of the Member States shall remain competent to apply Article 85(1) and Article 86
in accordance with Article 88 of the Treaty; they shall remain competent in this respect
notwithstanding the time limits specified in Article 5(1) and in Article 7(2) relating to notifi-
cation have not expired.
Regulation 17, sufpra note 38, at art. 9(3).
42 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177.
43 More particularly, Regulation 17/62 states that "[s]ubject to review of its decisions by the
Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable pur-
suant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty." Regulation 17, supra note 38, at art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
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1. General Characteristics of Community Law
The most important general characteristics of Community law are
precedence over national law, simultaneous and uniform application
and, in certain circumstances, direct applicability.
A. Precedence Over National Law
The Court of Justice established the general priority of Commu-
nity law over national law at an early stage. For example, in Humblet
v. Belgium,' the Court of Justice stated in the ECSC Treaty context
that:
... if the Court rules in a judgment that a legislative or administrative
measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State is contrary to
Community law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue of Article 86 of
the ECSC Treaty, to rescind the measure in question and to make repara-
tion for any unlawful consequences which may have ensued. This obliga-
tion is evident from the Treaty and from the Protocol which have the
force of law in the Member States following their ratification and which
take precedence over national law.45
The Court of Justice has since continued to emphasize the priority
of Community law over national law in the context of the EEC Treaty
as well. The Court's ruling in Internationale Handelgeselschaft4 6 is
typical. There the Court stated:
[R]ecourse to the Legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge
the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community
would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Commu-
nity Law. The validity of such measures can only be judged in the light
of Community Law. In fact, the Law stemming from the Treaty, an in-
dependent source of Law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden
by rules of national Law, however framed, without being deprived of its
character as Community Law and without the Legal basis of the Commu-
nity itself being called in question. Therefore the validity of a Commu-
nity measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated
by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitu-
tional structure.4 7
Moreover, the Court of Justice indicated that Community law has
precedence over national measures, formulated before or after promul-
gation of the Community law. Discussing this concept in Pigs Market-
44 Jean E. Humblet v. Belgian State, [1960] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 559.
45 Id at 569 (emphasis added).
46 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr und Vorrastelle fur Gettreid und Fut-
termittel, [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255.
47 Id at 1134, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283 (emphasis added).
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ing Board v. Raymond Redmond,48 the Court stated:
In this respect the fact that one of the features of the Pigs Marketing
Scheme - namely the Movement of Pigs Regulations - was introduced
in 1972 subsequently to the date of the signature of the Treaty of Acces-
sion does not alter this situation since the precedence of Community law
over the provisions of national law applies without regard to the respective
dates of the provisions in question 49
In Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA ,50
the Court of Justice more narrowly defined the consequences that this
precedence has upon national courts of the Member States which are
confronted with a directly applicable provision of Community law.
The Court of Justice concluded that a national court, upon a request to
apply the provisions of Community law, has a duty to give complete
effect to those provisions, even if such duty requires a Court to ignore
national legislation adopted subsequent to Community law.51 Further,
a national court must grant this effect of its own motion. The EEC
Treaty therefore mandates that national courts enforce directly applica-
ble provisions of Community law in an absolute manner.
B. Simultaneous and Uniform Application
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty is the basic provision which assures
uniformity in Community law. By requiring strict adherence to this
provision in several judgments, the Court of Justice has consistently
upheld a policy of uniformity in Community law. For example, in
Costa v. ENELs2 the Court of Justice stated:
[T]he integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which
derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit
of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system
accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot there-
fore be inconsistent with that legal system. The executiveforce of Commu-
nity law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent
domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty set out in Article 5(2) and giving rise to the discrimination prohib-
ited by Article 7.53
Furthermore, in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,54 the Court of Jus-
tice concluded that Member States could not be permitted to retain
48 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. I. Rep. 2347, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 177.
49 Id at 2373, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 204 (emphasis added).
5o [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 263.
51 Id at 657, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.L at 284.
52 [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 425.
53 Id at 593-94, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455 (emphasis added).
54 [1969] E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 1, 14, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100, 118-19.
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laws which alter the effectiveness of the Treaty. The Court observed
that without uniform application of the Treaty, the Community system
would be impeded and its aims imperiled.
The Court of Justice has also required uniformity in the applica-
tion of secondary legislation. In Commission v. Italy, Case 39/72, the
Court underscored the above policies by concluding that the simultane-
ous and uniform application of the Community regulations must not be
jeopardized." Furthermore, in Commission v. United Kingdom, Case
128/78,56 the Court of Justice concluded that Community regulations
must be followed in their entirety:
Article 189 of the Treaty provides that a regulation shall be binding "in
its entirety" in the Member States. As the Court has already stated in its
judgment of February 7, 1973 (Case 39/72, Commission v. Italian Repub-
lic (1973) E.C.R. 101) it cannot therefore be accepted that a Member
State should apply in an incomplete or selective manner provisions of a
Community legislation which it has opposed or which it considers con-
trary to its national interests.57
C Direct Applicability
Certain provisions of the EEC Treaty have been held to be directly
applicable by their very nature. In the field of antitrust rules, the Court
of Justice indicated that Articles 85(1) and 86 are directly applicable.
In addition, Article 189 makes all EEC Treaty regulations directly ap-
plicable and binding in all Member States.5"
2. Specifc Relation of National and Community Law in the
Antitrust Field
Having defined the area of jurisdiction granted to the European
Communities and analyzed the general nature of Community law, this
article will now examine how the specific relationship between national
and Community antitrust law is established. In order to answer this
question, several situations must be examined.
First, there is the situation of an absence of Community jurisdic-
tion. National antitrust law applies fully when the Community does
not have jurisdiction. An example is a case where conduct of an enter-
55 Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, Case 39/72, [1973] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 101, 114, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 439, 456.
56 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, Case 128/78, [1979] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 45.
57 Id at 428, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 55 (emphasis added).
58 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189, provides that "[a] regulation shall have general appli-
cation. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States."
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prise could fall under the EEC Treaty, but the conduct is not of a na-
ture to affect trade between Member States.
Likewise, there is no problem defining the relationship between
national and Community antitrust law when the Community has exclu-
sive jurisdiction. National law cannot apply in such a case. For exam-
ple, the Community has exclusive jurisdiction regarding enterprises
which are regulated by the ECSC Treaty. The Community also retains
exclusive jurisdiction for applying antitrust rules to cases involving the
agricultural sector and, as discussed earlier, probably also involving
those transport sectors covered by Article 84(1) of the EEC Treaty.
When both the Community rules and the national rules apply to a
particular sector, a situation of parallel jurisdiction emerges. Parallel
jurisdiction involves those sectors and/or products falling under the
EEC Treaty for which no special provisions apply. For these situa-
tions, Article 87(2)(e) empowers the Council of Ministers to enact legis-
lation which will determine the relationship between national and
Community antitrust law. However, no such legislation has yet been
adopted. Thus, the relationship will be examined awaiting future
legislation.
To explain the situation of parallel jurisdiction in the context of
antitrust rules, some authors in the early years of the EEC Treaty de-
veloped the Zweischranken Theory (theory of double barriers).59 Ac-
cording to this theory if conduct was not to be prohibited, it had to
satisfy the requirements of both national and Community antitrust law.
However, it is also arguable that given the precedence of Commu-
nity law, the European Economic Community enjoys defacto exclusive
jurisdiction within the field covered by Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty. This analysis appears in particular if the requirement of "trade
between Member States" is considered to separate the areas of jurisdic-
tion between Community and national antitrust law. Theoretically,
under this analysis, only a single barrier would exist. Either national or
Community antitrust rules would apply, according to whether the con-
duct could or could not affect trade between Member States.
The Court of Justice rejected both extreme positions and adopted
a middle road. It ruled that although there is in principle a situation of
parallel jurisdiction (where both sets of rules apply),'the application of
national law "may not prejudice the full and uniform application of
Community law or the effects of measures taken or to be taken to im-
59 Koch, Das VerhilIluis der Karelyorschrifter des E WG.-Vertrager zum Gesetz gegen
Wettbeweibsbeschriinkungen, DER BETRIEBSBERATtR 241 (1959).
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plement it."60 Consequently, the Court of Justice ruled that "[c]onflicts
between the rules of the Community and national rules in the matter of
the law on cartels must be resolved by applying the principle that Com-
munity law takes precedence."'" The Court of Justice has continued to
adhere to this position as illustrated in the recent Perfume cases:
[T]he Court stressed that parallel application of national competition law
can only be permitted in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform appli-
cation, throughout the common market, of the Community rules on car-
tels or the full effects of the measures adopted in implementation of those
rules.
62
A problem arises, however, in establishing how such a prejudice
should be avoided. The Court of Justice already provided guidance for
the situation in which a decision to be rendered by a national authority
could conflict with a previous Commission decision. Referring to this
situation, the Court in Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt stated:
[I]t follows from the foregoing that should it prove that a decision of a
national authority regarding an agreement would be incompatible with a
decision adopted by the Commission at the culmination of the procedure
initiated by it, the national authori y is required to take proper account of
the effects of the latter decision.63
The Court of Justice adopted a similar position with respect to a situa-
tion in which a Commission decision is in the process of being adopted.
The Court stated:
[W]here, during national proceedings, it appears possible that the deci-
sions to be taken by the Commission at the culmination of a procedure
still in progress concerning the same agreement may conflict with the ef-
fects of the decision of the national authorities, it isfor the latter to take the
appropriate measures. 
64
On the occasion of a 1974 meeting with the national experts from
the Member States on restrictive practices, the Commission, in its
Fourth Report on Competition Policy,65 commented on the judgment
in the Wilhelm case of 1969. According to the Commission, a distinc-
tion should be made between directly applicable prohibitions under
Articles 85(1) and 86 and exemptions from the ban on restrictive prac-
tices under Article 85(3).
With respect to the prohibitions under Articles 85(1) and 86, the
60 Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 15, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 120.
'61 Id at 14, [19691 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119.
62 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, 2375, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 99, 136.
63 [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 14, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119 (emphasis added).
64 Id at 14-15, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 120 (emphasis added).
65 EUROPEAN COMMUNiTiES COMMISSION, FOURTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 27 n.
43-47 (1975).
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Commission maintained that Member States are required to abstain
from any measure which might jeopardize either the full and uniform
application of these prohibitions throughout the Common Market or
the effectiveness of measures taken, or to be taken, in implementation
of these prohibitions. The Commission observed, however, that na-
tional authorities are free to apply their national laws along the same
lines as Community law. The practical result of this is that a practice
prohibited under Community antitrust law cannot be exempted under
national antitrust law.
Discussing exemptions under Article 85(3), the Commission stated
further:
The primacy of Community law is equally valid as a principle in relation
to exemptions from the ban on restrictive practices granted pursuant to
Article 85(3). In the judgment of February 13, 1969, the Court rejected
the argument that exemption by the Commission withdraws only the
Community barrier to a restrictive practice under Article 85(1), leaving
unimpaired the national authority's power to prohibit such a practice
under its own law (double barrier theory).
This is in accordance with the principle that the provisions of Article 85
must be seen as a whole and therefore applied as uniformly as possible.
Even so, the Court's judgment of February 13, 1969 leaves open the ques-
tion whether the primacy of Community exemptions constitutes a strict
rule, or whether it should be regarded rather as a flexible principle in the
application of which it is permissible to take account of the respective inter-
ests of the Community and of Member States. 
66
During the procedural hearings in the Perfume cases, the Commission
argued that the primacy of Community exemptions should be regarded
as a rather strict rule.67 In his opinion in the same cases, Advocate
General Reichl, however, did not address this point because the sys-
tems of selective distribution in the perfume sector had not been ex-
empted under Article 85(3).6 s
The Court of Justice also disregarded this question in these cases,
claiming that the Commission had concluded that the examined con-
duct fell outside the scope of application of Article 85(1) and therefore
that Article 85(3) did not apply.69 Thus, it remains an open question
66 Id at point 45 (emphasis added).
67 Submission of the Commission, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2327, 2356-57.
68 See, Opinion of Advocate General Reichi, id. at 2377, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 105.
The Commission concurred with Advocate General Reichl's ruling on this point.
69 The Court of Justice concluded generally:
It has been claimed that the application of national competition law may not be permitted
where it would result in an exemption granted by a decision or a block exemption being
called into question. It follows, however, from the observations set forth above that the
agreements which form the subject matter of the present cases do not benefit from any deci-
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whether the Court of Justice agrees completely with the Commission's
position on this question or not.
Several arguments may be made in favor of the Commission's po-
sition. Most importantly, the terms of Article 85(3) provide support for
the Commission's position that an exemption is only granted if the
practice in question contributes to the fulfillment of objectives of the
EEC Treaty. An exemption under Article 85(3) has to be denied if the
practice imposes on the undertakings concerned, restrictions which are
not indispensable to the attainment of the objectives of improving the
production or distribution of goods, or promoting technical and eco-
nomic progress. Finally, an exemption will not be given if it will deter
the objectives which promote the harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities throughout the Community, as mentioned in Article 2
of the EEC Treaty.
To allow a Member State to apply its national law in order to pro-
hibit a practice exempted under Article 85(3), would result in impeding
the fulfillment of a significant objective of the EEC Treaty. This argu-
ment was implicitly adopted by the Court of Justice in Wilhelm v.
Bundeskartellamt.70 There the Court noted that, while the EEC
Treaty's main objective is to eliminate any obstacles to free trade
among Member States in the Common Market, the Treaty "also permits
the Community authorities to carry out certain positive, though indirect
action with a view to promoting a harmonious development of economic
activities within the whole Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Treaty."
7 1
Secondly, the Commission's approach is justified in light of the
need for attaining a simultaneous and uniform application of Commu-
nity law. Specifically, the application of Article 85(3) would be im-
peded if an exempted practice could be prohibited in some Member
States and not in others. If Member States could prohibit practices ex-
sion in application of Article 85(3). Moreover, it is not in dispute that the agreements con-
cerned do not come within the scope of any regulation granting block exemption.
The contracts in question merely formed the subject matter of a decision to close the file on
the case taken by the Commission, which gave the opinion that there was no need for it to
take action in respect of the contracts in question under the provisions of Article 85(1). The
fact cannot by itself have the result of preventing the national authorities from applying to
those agreements provisions of national competition law which may be more rigorous than
Community law in this respect. The fact that a practice has been held by the Commission not
to fall within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Article 85(l) and (2), the scope of
which is limited to agreements capable of affecting trade between Member States, in no way
prevents that practice from being considered by the national authorities from the point of
view of the restrictive effects which it may produce nationally.
id at 2375, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 136.
70 [19691 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100.
71 Id. at 14, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119 (emphasis added).
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empted by the Community, then in effect provisions of national law
would delimit the application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty. This
would also be contrary to the principle of precedence of Community
law.
Finally, if a Member State were permitted to prohibit a practice
which had been exempted under Article 85(3) pursuant to a Commis-
sion decision, this could create confusion regarding Community law
itself. Indeed certain practices are exempted by way of regulations,
which are, according to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, directly applica-
ble in all Member States. To admit that provisions of national law
could prohibit practices which are exempted by decision, but not those
which are exempted by regulation, would introduce an incoherence in
Community law because the effect of the exemption would not depend
on the nature of the Commission's action (i.e., in granting the exemp-
tion), but rather on the form of the action (i.e., regulation or decision).
Nevertheless, some arguments have been advanced to counter this
approach 2 Specifically, it might be argued that the application of na-
tional antitrust laws would enhance economic development in the
Common Market. By signing and adhering to the EEC Treaty, Mem-
ber States have subscribed to the fulfillment of the objectives of this
Treaty. Article 3(f) of this Treaty institutes a system that ensures that
competition in the Common Market is not distorted.
A Member State could, however, for reasons of individual internal
economic policy for instance, seek to promote a higher degree of com-
petition in the Common Market than the degree which is necessary for
the fulfillment of the objective contained in Article 3(f). As a result of
this individual policy, this Member State could then attempt to apply
internal antitrust rules which are stricter than the provisions of Article
85(3). Yet at the same time, although these rules would differ from
those rules established in the Community, they would not jeopardize
the fulfillment of the objective articulated in Article 3(f). The only re-
sult of the application of these stricter national antitrust rules would be
to promote more competition than is required by Article 3(f). Thus,
according to this argument, an increase in competition might result in
more economic interpenetration, or in other words, could lead to a bet-
ter functioning Common Market.
72 See, Markert, Some Legal andAdministrative Problems of the Community and National Com-
petition Law in the EEC, 11 Comm. MKT. L. REv. 92 (1974). It should, in this context, be
remembered that the Member States have the right to request an action by the Commission under
Article 3(2)(b) of Regulation 17/62, must be consulted according to Article 10 of the same regula-
tion, and have the authority to request the annulment of acts of the Commission through the
procedure of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, note 3 supra.
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The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that the EEC Treaty
does not merely promote the fulfillment of the single objective in Arti-
cle 3(f) ensuring that competition will not be distorted, but in addition
fosters other more positive objectives. For example, the EEC Treaty
promotes the harmonious development of economic activities through-
out the Community as stated in Article 2-of this Treaty.
Competition policy should contribute to the fulfillment of these
other objectives. One way that this can be accomplished is by provid-
ing adequate exemptions under Article 85(3). The Court of Justice has
already indicated that Article 85(3) could be applied in this way. In
Metro v. Commission7 3 the Court stated:
The establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period constitutes
a stabilizing factor with regard to the provision of employment which,
since it improves the general conditions ofproduction, especially when mar-
ket conditions are unfavorable, comes within theframework of the objectives
to which reference may be had pursuant to Article 85(3).
7 4
A similar position was taken by the Court of Justice in its recent judg-
ment in the FEDETAB Case.7 5
The Court of Justice in several judgments clearly held that the
provisions of Article 85(3) must be viewed broadly in order to coordi-
nate the various objectives of the EEC Treaty. For example, the Court
in 1973 stated:
... if Article 3(f) provides for the institution of a system ensuring that
competition in the Common Market is not distorted, then it requires a
fortiori that competition must not be eliminated. This requirement is so
essential that without it numerous provisions of the Treaty would be
pointless. Moreover, it corresponds to the precept of Article 2 of the
Treaty according to which one of the tasks of the Community is 'to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic
activities.' Thus the restraints on competition which the Treaty allows under
certain conditions because of the need to harmonize the various objectives of
the Treaty, are limited by the requirements of Articles 2 and 3. Going
beyond this limit involves the risk that the weakening of competition
would conflict with the aims of the Common Market.
73 Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission of the European Communities,
[1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. I [hereinafter cited as Metro v.
Commission].
74 Id at 1916, [1978] 2 Comm. Mtk. L.R. at point 43 (emphasis added).
75 Heintz van Landewyck S.a.r.l., Federation Belgo-Luxembourgeoise des Industries du
Tabac A.s.b.1., (FEDETAB) and others v. Commission of the European Communities, [1980] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 134.
76 Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co., Inc. v. Commission of the European
Communities, [1973] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 244, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199,223-24 (empha-
sis added).
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More recently, in Metro v. Commission, the Court recognized the need
to preserve competition when it concluded:
The powers conferred upon the Commission under Article 85(3) show
that the requirements for the maintenance of workable competition may
be reconciled with the safeguarding of objectives of a diferent nature and
that to this end certain restrictions on competition are permissible, provided
that they are essential to the attainment of those objectives and that they do
not result in the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the
Common Market."
Finally, it might be argued that all the practices exempted by the
Commission do not equally contribute to the fulfillment of the various
objectives of the EEC Treaty. Even if it has not been done up to now,
it could be possible to draw a distinction between those practices
strictly necessary to the fulfillment of these objectives and those prac-
tices which are not. To illustrate this, one could, for example, distin-
guish between an exemption granted to a joint venture promoting
industrial development and research in an advanced technological sec-
tor, and an exemption given to a system of selective distribution in the
perfume sector. With respect to the latter category of exemptions, one
would not be able to raise the same objections to a possible interdiction
of the exempted practice by the stricter antitrust rules of a Member
State. Presumably, the Commission could even indicate in its decisions
the extent to which the exempted practice fulfills EEC Treaty
objectives.
The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that Article 85(3)(a)
states that an exemption will be granted only if a practice which re-
stricts competition does not ". . . impose on the undertakings con-
cerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives. ' T If a practice is not considered strictly necessary to
the fulfillment of the EEC Treaty objectives, it is difficult to see how
this practice could satisfy the condition of indispensability under Arti-
cle 85(3)(a). In other words, it must be admitted that the provisions of
Article 85(3) render impossible a distinction between several exempted
practices, of which some would be strictly necessary to the fulfillment
of the Treaty objectives, while others would not. If certain practices do
not fulfill the condition of Article 85(3)(a), they remain under the pro-
hibition of Article 85(1) and, therefore, are already forbidden under the
EEC antitrust rules before they could be apprehended by national anti-
77 [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1905, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at point 21 (emphasis
added).
78 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 85(3)(a).
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trust rules. Where both rules forbid such a practice the conflict be-
tween national and Community antitrust law has in fact disappeared.
Concluding this analysis of the relationship between national and
Community law with respect to an exemption under Article 85(3), it is
evident that exemptions granted by the Commission, by way of regula-
tions or by way of decisions, have to take-precedence over an applica-
tion of stricter national antitrust laws. The very nature of the
exemption, which is to promote the fulfillment of the objectives of the
EEC Treaty, commands this conclusion.
Article 9(1) of Regulation 17/6279 confirms this conclusion. Pur-
suant to Article 9(1), the Commission has the sole power to grant ex-
emptions. Under the EEC Treaty, the Commission is the institution
which must represent the common interest. The balance of power insti-
tuted by the EEC Treaty would be upset if the Commission's authority
to decide whether a practice is necessary to fulfill the common objec-
tives of the EEC Treaty was left to be ultimately decided by the na-
tional Member States.
The L'Oreal" case of 1980 further supports this point. In L'Oreal
the Court of Justice indicated that decisions which grant the Article
85(3) exemption give the parties to the exempted practice the individ-
ual right to prevail against third parties if the latter challenge the prac-
tice under Article 85(2).81 Given the precedence of Community law,
this reasoning must, afortiori, be applied against third parties in ac-
tions involving a prohibition of national antitrust rules.
3. Supplementary Application of National Law
Although Community antitrust law takes precedence over national
antitrust law, and the Court of Justice and the European Commission
attach great weight to this precedence, national law could still be ap-
plied in certain non-conflictual situations. It could thus be necessary to
apply national law when it supplements or complements Community
law. In such cases, there is no conflict with Community law. Several
examples of situations in which national law does apply in this manner
illustrate this point.
79 Regulation 17, note 38 supra.
80 NV L'Oreal and SA L'Oreal v. PVBA DeNiewe AMCK, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775,
[1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235.
81 Id at 3793, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 254.
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A. Application of National Law in Execution of
Community Law Provisions
First, it must be pointed out that national law applies whenever
Community law provisions require national law to be applied in the
execution of Community law. An example of this is Article 14(6) of
Regulation 17/62:
Where an undertaking opposes an investigation ordered pursuant to this
Article, the Member States concerned shall afford the necessary assistance
of the officials authorized by the Commission to enable them to make
their investigation. Member States, after consultation with the Commis-
sion, take the necessary measures to this end before October 1, 1962.82
In execution of this provision several national measures were
adopted. 3 For new Member States similar provisions apply. a
B. Application of National Law to Complement Community Law
Where Community law is silent, rules of national law can some-
times be applied. The best example of this is the granting of damages
for violations of Community antitrust law prohibitions. The first study
published by the European Commission on competition problems
made clear that in each of the six original Member States, national
rules on damages could complement Community law in this manner.8
An application of this occurred in Germany in a judgment on Oc-
tober 23, 1979 by the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme
Court) in the case of BMW Cars.86 In that case the Court ruled that
the German courts had jurisdiction over a case where a Belgian car
distributor induced its Belgian dealers not to sell to a German trade
customer in order to partition the markets (which is in effect, a boycott
prohibited by section 26 of the German Restraint of Competition Act
and a practice prohibited by Article 85 of the EEC Treaty), because in
82 Regulation 17, supra note 38, at art. 14(6) (emphasis added).
83 These measures along with their respective countries follow:
France: Decret 18.2 1972 (J.O.Fr n.47 of 25.2.72)
Germany: Law 17.8 1967 (Bundesgesetzblatt of 23.8.67 at 911)
The Netherlands: Law 10.7 1968 (NL Staatsblad 394/395 of 1968)
Belgium: Arret6 Royal 18.1 1966 (Moniteur Beige of 22.1.66/753)
Luxemburg: Arrete 26.5 1965 (Memorial A 31 of 15.6.65).
84 See Act of Accession, 1972, Annex I, V Competition, point 1, 15 J.O. COMM. Eun. (No. L
73) 14 (1972). See also Act concerning the conditions of Accession of the Hellenic Republic and
the adjustments to the Treaties, Annex I, V Competition, point 1, 22 O.J. Eun COMM. (No. L 291)
93 (1979).
85 Etudes, serie concurrence, n. 1, La reparation des consequences dommageables d'une viola-
tion des articles 85 et 86 du traite instituant La CEE (Bruxelles 1966). This publication does not
exist in English.
86 Free translation by the author. Judgment not yet published.
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such case the indirect object was to prejudice the German customer in
his home market and, therefore, one of the elements of the restriction
of competition, a tortious act, was present. Similar cases are pending in
other Member States.
C Application of General Princples of National Law to Interpret
Community Law
The Court of Justice recognized that common principles of na-
tional law might be used to assist in the interpretation of Community
antitrust law. The Court adopted this method of reasoning in Trans-
ocean Marine Paint v. Commission, 87 finding:
[B]oth from the nature and objectives of procedure for hearings, and from
Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation 99/63, that this Regulation, notwith-
standing the cases specifically dealt with in Articles 2 and 4, applies the
general rule that a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a
decision taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to
make his point of view known. This rule requires that an undertaking be
clearly informed, in good time, of the essence of conditions to which the
Commission intends to subject an exemption and it must have the oppor-
tunity to submit its observations to the Commission.88
In such situations, the application of national rules does not lead to a
conflict with Community antitrust rules.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between national and Community antitrust rules
is currently in a transitional period. In general, national antitrust law is
being subordinated to Community antitrust law. This development is
essential to the fulfillment of all of the objectives of the Common Mar-
ket as set forth in the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and
the European Economic Community Treaty. Uniform application of
Community antitrust law provides substantial economic benefits to al
Member States. Moreover, it minimizes the opportunity for a national
authority to advance policies which may improve that nation's econ-
omy, but will be detrimental to the whole of the Common Market.
This trend towards the priority of Community antitrust law, however,
does not entirely exclude the jurisdiction of the Member States.
The dynamics of the European Communities require the practi-
tioner to remain abreast of developments in the interrelationship of
87 Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European Communities, [19741
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1063, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 459. See also Conclusions of A.G. Warner,
id. at 1083, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 462.
88 Id at 1079-80, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 477 (emphasis added).
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Community and national antitrust law. Although Community antitrust
law has begun to take precedence in more sectors, the importance of
national antitrust law should not be minimized. The relationship be-
tween Community and national antitrust law may be most significant
in the present context of parallel jurisdiction. It is essential that na-
tional antitrust law be sometimes applied to complement and supple-
ment Community antitrust law.
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